The US-India Nuclear Pact: A Good Deal by Mistry, Dinshaw
The civilian nuclear cooperation deal between India and the United States, struck in July 2005 by President George W. Bush 
and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, con-
stitutes a major initiative for both nations. Presi-
dent Bush seeks pathbreaking exemptions in US 
law and international nuclear regime guidelines 
to allow for nuclear energy transfers to India. In 
return, India has agreed to separate its civilian and 
military nuclear facilities and put the civilian com-
ponent under international safeguards.
Specifically, India would place 14 of its 22 ther-
mal power reactors in operation or under construc-
tion, representing 65 percent of its nuclear power 
capacity, under permanent international safeguards. 
It would keep its breeder reactor outside the safe-
guards. And it would shut down one of its two 
dedicated military-related reactors that produce 
weapons-grade plutonium. New Delhi also has 
agreed to maintain its self-imposed moratorium on 
nuclear testing, support talks on the Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty, and adhere to international guidelines 
on nuclear and missile export controls. 
This agreement is intended to strengthen 
Washington’s strategic partnership with India, 
and thereby to advance key US objectives, such as 
promoting a stable power balance in Asia. Yet crit-
ics contend that the deal could unravel the care-
fully woven fabric of the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. We affirm that the nuclear deal with India 
is likely to result in strategic gains for Washington, 
and it could also bring energy, economic, and envi-
ronmental benefits. 
The agreement’s effect on the nonprolifera-
tion regime would be mixed. It might undermine 
an important nonproliferation norm on nuclear 
energy transfers. However, this negative impact can 
be reduced by appropriately framing the exemp-
tion for India. And the accord could bring prolif-
eration benefits. Stronger US-India strategic ties 
resulting from the pact would lessen India’s need 
to greatly expand its nuclear arsenal and would 
bind Indian governments more firmly to norms 
against nuclear testing. Ultimately, in the absence 
of a nuclear agreement, the strategic gains would 
be forfeited and, while the proliferation concerns 
would not arise, the proliferation benefits would 
also not materialize. Thus, the overall benefits of 
the agreement outweigh those that would flow 
from not implementing it. 
STRATEGIC GAINS
In the past few years, military, economic, and 
political ties between the United States and India 
have dramatically expanded. The two coun-
tries have conducted a series of military exer-
cises involving all three branches of their armed 
forces; there is growing, if fitful, intelligence shar-
ing between the two nations; and India may well 
purchase substantial quantities of US military 
equipment in the foreseeable future. An expand-
ing economic partnership, in turn, undergirds 
the strategic relationship. For example, some 
220 American Fortune 500 companies have sig-
nificant investments in India. As a consequence 
of these profound changes, Washington now 
sees New Delhi as a potential strategic partner. 
By removing barriers to technology coopera-
tion with India in the nuclear area, the nuclear 
agreement is intended to lay the foundations for 
greater strategic cooperation. As we have written 
in the summer issue of World Policy Journal, such 
cooperation with India would advance US security 
objectives in Asia and beyond.
“Stronger US-India strategic ties resulting from the pact would lessen India’s 
need to greatly expand its nuclear arsenal and would bind Indian governments 
more firmly to norms against nuclear testing.”
375
The US-India Nuclear Pact: A Good Deal
DINSHAW MISTRY AND SUMIT GANGULY
DINSHAW MISTRY is an associate professor of political science 
at the University of Cincinnati and author of Containing Mis-
sile Proliferation (University of Washington Press, 2005). 
SUMIT GANGULY, a Current History contributing editor, is a 
professor of political science at Indiana University. His most 
recent book, edited with Andrew Scobell and Brian Shoup, is 
US-India Strategic Cooperation into the Twenty-First Cen-




 http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/105/694/375/389585/curh_105_694_375.pdf by guest on 03 N
ovem
ber 2020
376 • CURRENT HISTORY • November 2006
First, a stronger partnership with New Delhi 
would help Washington balance a rising China. 
There is little question that American policy mak-
ers harbor misgivings about the dramatic growth of 
Chinese economic and military power. And, while 
New Delhi’s relations with Beijing have improved 
substantially in recent years, India retains some 
anxieties about a resurgent and possibly revanchist 
China. Although Washington cannot realistically 
expect to use Indian military bases in the event of a 
conflict with China, it can reasonably expect India 
to share critical intelligence about Chinese military 
capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean and its 
littoral states. Given the significance of the region 
to India’s maritime interests, the growing Chinese 
presence in Burma has generated considerable mis-
givings in Indian military circles. 
Second, a viable strategic partnership with 
India could bring military and political benefits for 
Washington. In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, 
Indian naval vessels helped patrol areas in the 
Indian Ocean littoral in concert with the US Navy. 
More recently, in the aftermath of the 2004 Asian 
tsunami, India coordinated relief efforts with the 
US Navy from Sri Lanka to Indonesia. These two 
ventures were made possible because the two 
navies had developed prior habits of cooperation 
through a series of naval exercises. Likewise, the US 
and Indian air forces have conducted mock hostile 
exercises, and Indian and American ground troops 
have held joint exercises in terrain ranging from the 
tropical jungles of India’s northeast to the frozen 
wastes of Alaska.
India has started to work in concert with the 
United States on international security issues that 
extend well beyond South Asia. After considerable 
deliberation, for example, India chose to align itself 
with the United States on referring Iran to the UN 
Security Council in September 2005 and again in 
February 2006. New Delhi would not have aligned 
with Washington had a nuclear cooperation agree-
ment not been under consideration at the time. 
Overall, under a stronger strategic relationship, 
the scale of US-India military cooperation, security 
and foreign policy coordination, intelligence shar-
ing, and arms sales could all increase. In the past few 
years, these activities have proceeded apace despite 
a change in government in India from the conserva-
tive Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition to a more 
left-of-center Congress Party administration. 
On the other hand, if the nuclear agreement fails 
to materialize, the substantial improvement that 
has taken place in US-India relations over the past 
decade will suffer a significant setback. Many of the 
strategic initiatives under way could face reconsider-
ation. Key individuals and groups within the Indian 
political arena who are virulently opposed to the 
improvement of US-India ties would exploit the fail-
ure to realize the nuclear deal as evidence of Ameri-
can perfidy and the ruling Indian government’s 
ineptitude and naïveté. Consequently, the strategic 
significance of the nuclear agreement for advancing 
US-India bilateral relations cannot be overstated.
Even with a nuclear pact, there are possible sce-
narios under which the cooperative trend in US-India 
strategic ties could be hobbled. If, after future elec-
tions, a coalition of left-wing political parties were to 
govern India, they could distance India from Amer-
ica and seek to scale back the dimensions of military 
cooperation. But the likelihood of this is generally 
small. Another scenario involves the resurgence of 
populist hostility in the United States toward India 
over the question of employment outsourcing. This 
issue had limited traction, however, during the 2004 
US elections and is now mostly a spent force. A third 
possibility might involve closer US alignment with 
Pakistan that angers India. But this will not occur if 
Washington is careful not to alienate New Delhi as 
it maintains ties with Islamabad.
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
The nuclear agreement with India raises two 
sets of proliferation concerns. The first concern is 
that granting India an exemption from an impor-
tant nonproliferation rule would undermine the 
nonproliferation regime. In particular, India would 
be exempted from a 30-year-old policy—imple-
mented under US law and international Nuclear 
Supplier Group guidelines—that forbids the trans-
fer of civilian nuclear technology to any country 
that has not acceded to the nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) and accepted full-scope interna-
tional safeguards. A major concern, as The New 
York Times noted in an April 7, 2006, editorial, is 
that, “In trying to give India a special exemption, 
Mr. Bush is threatening a carrot-and-stick approach 
that has been effective for more than 35 years. It is 
the legal basis on which Secretary of State Con-
doleezza Rice is trying to build a coalition against 
Iran’s nuclear program. The treaty has persuaded 
countries like South Korea, Japan, and Brazil to 
forgo nuclear weapons.”
The exemption for India thus could set a wor-
risome precedent, one that might affect the deci-
sions of key countries to remain in the NPT. If a 
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economy, and particularly on foreign imports of 
reactors and fuel, then it is less likely to break out 
of the NPT if this disrupts its energy supplies. But if 
leaving the NPT would not affect a country’s nuclear 
energy imports (because it is receiving an exemp-
tion from Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines), it 
may be more inclined to break out from the NPT. 
The effect of such a precedent may well depend on 
how the exemption for India is framed.
If it emphasizes that countries may only win 
exemption from the full-scope safeguards rule after 
being subject to this rule for some 20 to 30 years 
(as is the case with India), and only if they adhere 
to major nonproliferation rules, the damage to the 
nonproliferation regime may be limited. In this 
case, the carrot-and-stick NPT approach would still 
be affirmed, because India incurred important costs 
(being denied civilian nuclear imports for three 
decades) before receiv-
ing an exemption from 
this approach. Further, 
New Delhi only received 
an exemption because 
of its good export con-
trol record, and it would 
retain its exempt status 
only as long as it complies with nonproliferation 
norms such as those against nuclear testing.
A second proliferation apprehension is that the 
nuclear agreement would enable India to expand 
its nuclear program and this would cause an arms 
race with Pakistan and China. There is concern 
that foreign-supplied uranium fuel for India’s civil-
ian reactors would free up India’s limited uranium 
supplies for use in military reactors, and this could 
allow a large nuclear buildup by India. Yet, in the 
short term, India may have only one main reac-
tor producing weapons-grade plutonium. This is 
the Dhruva reactor, which produces plutonium 
sufficient for about five nuclear weapons annu-
ally. (India’s other dedicated military reactor, the 
Cirus reactor, which produces plutonium for about 
two nuclear weapons annually, is to be shut down 
by 2010.) Thus, even if foreign-supplied uranium 
frees up some of India’s uranium supplies for mili-
tary reactors, India would only produce weapons-
grade plutonium for about five nuclear weapons 
per year from this military reactor. Although India 
would retain eight heavy water reactors outside 
international safeguards, these produce reactor-
grade plutonium. While it is possible to use such 
plutonium in a nuclear weapon, it is not ideal for 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, India already has a 
very large stock of reactor-grade plutonium and 
plans to use about one-third to half of this material 
to fuel its first breeder reactor (similar amounts 
may be needed for future breeder reactors).
India’s breeder reactor, which is outside safe-
guards, could produce refined plutonium suffi-
cient for dozens of nuclear weapons every year. 
This concern will not be realized in the short term, 
however, because the breeder will not be opera-
tional until around 2010. A few years after it goes 
on line, the breeder would produce vast amounts 
of plutonium. But even then India may not use 
most of this plutonium for nuclear weapons, for a 
number of reasons.
First, India may soon have enough nuclear 
material to field a minimum deterrent. Until now, 
India’s Dhruva and Cirus reactors have produced 
plutonium sufficient for 65 to 110 nuclear weap-
ons. Experts estimate 
that if India has between 
100 and 150 deliverable 
nuclear weapons, they 
provide a sufficient deter-
rent against China and 
Pakistan. Thus, India may 
not require much pluto-
nium from the breeder for a minimum deterrent. 
Second, India may require breeder-derived pluto-
nium to fuel future breeder reactors. (The pluto-
nium derived from India’s heavy water reactors may 
be insufficient for fueling more than two or three 
breeder reactors.) India’s Department of Atomic 
Energy plans to build three additional breeders that 
could become operational around 2020. In this case, 
much of the plutonium produced from India’s first 
breeder reactor would not be available for nuclear 
weapons (though some of it could be), and instead 
would be used to fuel future breeder reactors.
Further, as the India-US strategic relationship 
deepens, India is less likely to feel the need to build 
a substantial nuclear arsenal. Increased military-
to-military cooperation with Washington, and the 
possibility of reliable access to American conven-
tional weapons, would lessen the need for India to 
greatly expand its nuclear weapons program. As a 
result, India would then be more amenable to join-
ing the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which would 
be a major barrier to India’s accumulation of plu-
tonium. Once this treaty is in place and India signs 
it, India would not be able to use future plutonium 
from any of its reactors for nuclear weapons.
This leads to a nonproliferation benefit of the 
nuclear agreement: its potential for restraining 
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India’s nuclear expansion and for binding India 
to norms against nuclear testing. Most of India’s 
nuclear weapons are believed to be first-generation 
fission weapons, and India’s 1998 thermonuclear 
test was at best a partial success. New Delhi has 
committed itself to a moratorium on nuclear test-
ing under the US-India agreement. If India breaks 
this moratorium, it will jeopardize its ability to 
import nuclear reactors and fuel to meet its energy 
requirements. Given a stronger strategic partner-
ship with Washington, governments in New Delhi 
would have less compulsion to consider—and 
would be loath to alienate Washington with—a 
resumption of nuclear tests.
RECOGNIZING REALITY
India’s economy has grown at a rate of 6 to 
7 percent annually in recent years. If this rate 
is maintained, India’s demand for electricity is 
expected to increase considerably, perhaps by 10 
percent per year. The 
nuclear deal would 
provide an important 
and environmen-
tally friendly energy 
source for a growing 
Indian economy, and 
could also offer export opportunities for the US 
nuclear industry.
India’s existing reactors generate around 3,310 
megawatts (MW) of electricity and supply only about 
3 percent of India’s electricity. Reactors under con-
struction (including two Russian-built 1,000 MW 
reactors) will generate an additional 3,420 MW by 
2010. In the decade after 2010, India expects to 
build additional reactors that would generate per-
haps 5,000 MW. This would still leave the country 
short of its goal of generating 20,000 MW of nuclear 
power (representing perhaps 7 percent of India’s 
total electric generating capacity) by around 2020. 
To meet these energy targets, India could import six 
to ten reactors, two of which could be US light water 
reactors (possibly supplied by General Electric), 
which could result in a few thousand jobs, both 
directly and indirectly, for the US nuclear industry. 
India’s development and import of nuclear reac-
tors will have a positive environmental impact. 
Analysts estimate that if India increases its nuclear 
generating capacity nearly tenfold, then these 
nuclear plants, by displacing coal-fired plants, 
would lessen India’s carbon dioxide emissions by 
about 130 million tons per year. (For comparison, 
emission cuts planned by the European Union 
under the Kyoto Protocol are some 200 million 
tons per year.) Although these reductions repre-
sent only a small fraction of India’s carbon dioxide 
emissions, they would still make a positive contri-
bution to global environmental objectives.
It should be clarified that these energy, environ-
mental, and commercial calculations are based on 
the assumptions that India’s economy will main-
tain 6 to 7 percent growth rates over one to two 
decades, and that India will require and find it cost-
effective to use nuclear energy (rather than other 
forms of energy) to sustain this economic growth. 
Growth rates could fall during an economic cri-
sis, and nuclear power with its high capital costs 
could prove more expensive than alternative energy 
sources. Thus, it is difficult to estimate the magni-
tude of the economic, environmental, and energy 
gains from the nuclear agreement with India.
But even in the absence of the nuclear deal, India 
would continue to seek new sources of energy to 
fuel  and sustain 
its current rates of 
growth. In this quest 
for energy resources, 
it would invariably 
invest in nuclear 
reactors even if they 
failed to achieve the levels of efficiency and out-
put characteristic of Russian, French, or American 
reactors. (India has mostly built 220 MW reactors, 
and has only recently completed two 540 MW reac-
tors, whereas foreign suppliers could provide larger 
1,000 MW reactors.) Pursuing a strategy of technol-
ogy denial has only succeeded in slowing down 
India’s civilian and military nuclear programs. It 
has failed utterly to stop them.
 The nuclear agreement with India is not the 
first civilian nuclear cooperation pact with a 
nuclear weapon state that is outside the NPT. In 
1985, the Reagan administration reached a bilat-
eral civilian nuclear power agreement with the 
People’s Republic of China—which was not yet an 
NPT signatory. Although civilian nuclear transfers 
to India could undermine an important existing 
nonproliferation rule, the negative effects can be 
reduced by appropriately framing the exemption 
for India. Thus, if properly implemented, the 
nuclear agreement with India would be a good 
deal. It would recognize the reality of India’s 
nuclear weapons program and address India’s 
energy needs without undermining the nonprolif-
eration regime, and would considerably strengthen 
the US-India strategic partnership.  
A stronger partnership with New Delhi  
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